Token Security
Table of Contents
- Q1: How do we bind agent tokens to specific tools (Proof-of-Possession)?
- Q2: How do we prevent token leakage via prompt context?
- Q3: How do we authenticate agents that call third-party SaaS APIs?
- Q4: What’s the minimum viable rollout plan for agentic IAM?
Q1: How do we bind agent tokens to specific tools (Proof-of-Possession)?

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Q1: How do we bind agent tokens to specific tools (Proof-of-Possession)?
This is a great agentic control: a token should be usable only by the specific runtime/tool instance that requested it.
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With DPoP, the agent/tool holds a private key and proves possession on each request; the token is effectively bound to that key.
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With mTLS certificate-bound tokens, the access token is bound to the client certificate used in mutual TLS.
Then add “tool scoping” at the policy layer: tokens include a tool identifier, allowed endpoints, and action-level scopes (read vs write vs admin), and the resource server rejects mismatches.
Q2: How do we prevent token leakage via prompt context?
This is a great agentic control: a token should be usable only by the specific runtime/tool instance that requested it.
-
With DPoP, the agent/tool holds a private key and proves possession on each request; the token is effectively bound to that key.
-
With mTLS certificate-bound tokens, the access token is bound to the client certificate used in mutual TLS.
Then add “tool scoping” at the policy layer: tokens include a tool identifier, allowed endpoints, and action-level scopes (read vs write vs admin), and the resource server rejects mismatches.
Q3: How do we authenticate agents that call third-party SaaS APIs?
There are three common cases:
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SaaS supports OAuth: use OAuth authorization with strict scopes, store refresh tokens safely, and apply rotation where possible (modern BCP guidance supports this directionally).
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SaaS supports API keys only: keep keys in a vault/broker, never in prompts; issue the agent a capability (“call X”) and let the broker sign the request.
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Multi-tenant SaaS access: use separate credentials per tenant and enforce tenant-bound routing and auditing so one agent can’t drift into another tenant’s data plane.
When a SaaS offers mTLS or PoP options, take them—bearer keys are where breaches love to start.
Q4: What’s the minimum viable rollout plan for agentic IAM?
A pragmatic “MV” rollout that still matches modern standards:
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Inventory & identity model: define agent types (internal, customer-tenant, web-browsing) and give each a unique identity + ownership.
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Default auth pattern: choose one baseline (OAuth client credentials or SPIFFE identity) and require short-lived access tokens.
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Least privilege: scopes per tool/action; deny-by-default for high-risk operations.
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Sender-constrain high-risk paths: DPoP for app-layer PoP, or mTLS certificate-bound tokens for strong assurance.
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Secret hygiene: broker tokens, never print them, and automate rotation (refresh rotation + revocation).
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Observability: log “who/what/why” for agent actions (identity, tool, scope, decision, target), then alert on anomalies.
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