Advanced AuthZ Models

Q1: How do we model "tool credentials" linked to an agent identity?

Model tool credentials as capabilities bound to an agent identity, not as standalone secrets. The agent is the principal; each tool credential is a scoped credential object with:

1. tool name/endpoint,

2. allowed actions (read/write/admin),

3. constraints (time window, environment, tenant, IP/device, resource patterns), and

4. rotation/expiry rules.

Store only references where possible (vault IDs), and mint ephemeral tokens at runtime instead of long-lived keys.

Track a full lifecycle: issuance → use → rotation → revocation, and log every credential use as an agent event (who/what/why/where/when).

This makes credentials auditable and prevents “credential sprawl” as agents gain more tools over time.

Learn More

Q2: Is RBAC enough for Agentic IAM, or do we need ABAC/PBAC?

RBAC alone usually breaks for agents because agent actions are highly contextual and roles become either too broad (“agent-admin”) or too fragmented (role explosion). ABAC/PBAC are better fits because they let you express policies like:

“Agent can write only to these resources, for this task, in this environment, during this time window.”

PBAC adds structure by treating policies as first-class objects you can version, review, test, and roll out safely.

In practice: keep RBAC for coarse boundaries (baseline access), then use ABAC/PBAC for runtime constraints, intent, and fine-grained enforcement.

Learn More

Q3: What is "Context-Aware Authorization" for agents?

Context-aware authorization means the access decision depends on live signals around the request, not just the agent’s identity. Typical context inputs include: environment (prod vs staging), tenant, resource sensitivity, time, network/location, device posture, request rate, session risk score, and whether a human approved the action.

For agents, context is critical because the same agent may operate across multiple workflows; policies should allow actions only when the context matches the intended operating envelope. It’s how you enforce rules like “this agent can delete only in staging” or “writes in prod require step-up.”

Learn More

Q4: How do we prevent "Privilege Creep" for long-running agents?

Privilege creep happens when agents accumulate permissions for convenience and never give them back. Prevent it by making access temporary and revocable by default: use time-bound credentials, task-scoped permissions, and automatic expiry.

Add periodic “permission re-evaluation” (e.g., per task, per session, or per day) and require explicit re-authorization for sensitive actions.

Enforce separation between baseline identity and elevated privileges: the agent can request elevation, but elevation is granted only with policy checks (and optionally human approval). Finally, run continuous audits: detect unused permissions, long-lived credentials, and drift from least-privilege baselines.

Learn More